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Most existing credit default theories do not link causes directly to the effect of default and 
are unable to evaluate credit risk in a rapidly changing market environment, as 
experienced in the recent mortgage and credit market crisis.  Causal theories of credit 
default are needed to understand lending risk systematically and ultimately to measure 
and manage credit risk dynamically for financial system stability.  Unlike existing theories, 
credit default is treated in this paper by a joint model with dual causal processes of 
delinquency and insolvency.  A framework for developing causal credit default theories is 
introduced through the example of a new residential mortgage default theory.  This theory 
overcomes many limitations of existing theories, solves several outstanding puzzles and 
integrates both micro and macroeconomic factors in a unified financial economic theory 
for mortgage default. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A credit default represents the financial failure of an entity (a person or a company).  A 
theory of credit default should therefore represent a systematic understanding of the 
causes which directly lead to the effects which are associated with credit defaults.  Such a 
theory is required to provide direct causal connections between macroeconomic causes of 
changing financial environment and their microeconomic effects on changing personal or 
corporate financial conditions, leading to possible credit defaults.  Most existing theories
1 
of credit default do not meet this causal requirement. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to set down a framework from which causal credit default 
theories can be developed through a new structure for incorporating risk factors.  The 
framework and its application to develop a causal credit default theory include several 
other contributions. 
 
Firstly, a definition for credit default is given
2.  Surprisingly credit default has rarely been 
defined in research, even though in practice the term is used with several different 
meanings depending on the situation.  The credit default definition given here is used to 
develop the framework which is described in the next section. 
 
Secondly, the framework provides a new method
3 for developing causal credit default 
theories which are not heavily dependent on empirical data.  Many existing approaches
4 
face difficult problems of statistical estimation due to the lack of abundant and high 
quality data and their models suffer from historical sampling bias.  Our approach can be 
used to price credit risk in changing environments which may be without historical 
precedence whereas most existing approaches cannot, as we witnessed in the mortgage 
and credit crisis in 2007.  
 
Thirdly, the causal framework leads to unified credit default theories where the 
probability of default (PD) and loss given default (LGD) are determined
5 endogenously and 
consistently.  Existing approaches treat PD and LGD as separate estimations
6 and therefore 
face additional problems of consistency: such as those in relation to assumptions about 
how PD and LGD are correlated. 
 
Fourthly, as a concrete example, a causal credit default theory for residential mortgages is 
developed to illustrate the above benefits of the framework.   Surprisingly mortgage 
default theory has not advanced beyond credit default theories available generally for 
corporate securities even though the causes of mortgage defaults are much simpler
7 than 
the causes of corporate debt defaults.  Several sections
8 below are devoted to describing 
the details of the new theory of mortgage default. 
 
                                             
1 See Section 7 for a discussion of related work including a review of existing structural and reduced 
form approaches.  Some structural approaches may be considered causal, but most have only 
indirect causality when including additional risk factors, such as interest rates. Reduced form 
approaches generally make no claims to be causal, see Jarrow and Protter (2004). 
2 See Section 2. 
3 This is illustrated by the concrete example of a new mortgage default theory. 
4 See Section 7 particularly for the needs of reduced form approaches. 
5 See Section 5 for the case of mortgage defaults. 
6 See Section 7 for recent debates on their relationships. 
7 Wallace (2005) made this observation for mortgages, while Descartes (1637) made this observation 
generally for all analytical knowledge in his third rule of the “Method”.  Other examples of use of 
mortgage default theories include Elul (2006), Capozza, Kazarian and Thomson (1998) and Deng, 
Quigley and Van Order (2000). 
8 See Sections 3-5. Page 4 of 27 
Fifthly, the causal mortgage default theory provides a valid basis for stress testing of loan 
portfolios where macroeconomic causes are directly and nonlinearly linked
9 to 
microeconomic effects of default.  Existing non-causal theories suffer from linearization 
assumptions and from the uncertainty about whether the observed correlations between 
dependent and independent variables are not merely coincidences.  The theory developed 
here shows examples
10 of the drawbacks of linearization and how causal uncertainties can 
occur. 
 
Sixthly, with the new mortgage default theory, several outstanding puzzles in the credit 
default literature are resolved.   For example, the puzzles resolved include explanations of 
how falling mortgage delinquency rates and falling property prices can occur 
simultaneously in Hong Kong SAR
11 1998-2003 and how positive and negative correlations 
between PD and LGD are possible simultaneously in a portfolio. 
 
After the development of a causal credit default theory
12, we define at the end of Section 
5 the difference between direct and indirect causation and then discuss macroeconomic 
causes to credit default in Section 6.  In Section 7, we discuss related work by providing a 
limited review of existing approaches compared with the new approach described in this 
paper.  The final section is given over a conclusion and suggestions for further research. 
 
 
2. Definition of Credit Default 
 
The term “credit default” has been used with many different meanings in practice.  It can 
mean
13 something as minor as a late payment of a debt obligation, so that a bank can apply 
a penalty “default” interest rate between the due date and the actual payment date.  It 
can also mean something as serious as a bankruptcy or insolvency where the lender 
initiates a recovery process to limit loss from a collateralised loan.  In spite of an extensive 
literature on credit defaults there are few clearly stated definitions of credit default.     
 
Such varied use of terminology in practice raises doubt about what information is really 
contained in the empirical default frequency data collected by lending institutions and it is 
indicative of the absence of an accepted credit default paradigm which would have 
assisted in a more systematic collection of default data across the industry. 
 
Two concepts: delinquency and insolvency underlie most definitions of credit default.  
Delinquency is defined as a failure to meet a loan payment by a due date, whereas 
insolvency is defined as a situation where assets are less than liabilities.  Most usages of 
the term credit default really revolve around the concept of delinquency.  The current 
Basel II definition of default is essentially a 90-day delinquency definition, although there 
are issues of materiality, which relates to the dollar substance of the payments in arrears.  
On the other hand, the structural approach
14 to credit default theory uses implicitly the 
insolvency definition of credit default.   
 
The clearest definition of credit default is given by Moody’s
15 where a credit default
16 
involves both delinquency and the notion of expected loss to the lender.  This definition of 
                                             
9 See Section 6. 
10See Section 5 for a discussion. 
11See Yam (2003) and Fan & Peng (2005).  A resolution of the puzzle is given in Section 6. 
12See Sections 3-5.  
13In strict legal terms, a default is any failure to meet the terms of a credit agreement and 
therefore this meaning is a legal definition of default.  Clearly this definition is not useful for 
financial economic applications, because many such defaults would have little or no economic 
consequence.   
14See Section 4 and Section 7 for a discussion. 
15See Keenan (1999) for a description of their collection of default data. Page 5 of 27 
default comes closest to why one is interested
17 in credit defaults in the first place: it is to 
estimate expected losses from lending.  Even the delinquency definition of default with a 
specified time lag such as currently adopted by Basel II can be interpreted as a convenient 
indicator of potential loss for secured loans.  
 
The underlying logic is: if a corporation or an individual is unable to meet a debt payment 
obligation by the due date, then the assumption is either a debt-restructure or bridging 
finance will be sought by the borrower.  If the implied cash flow problem is not solved 
within a fixed period such as 90 calendar days for Basel II, then it is assumed that the 
entity may be insolvent, the loan is considered formally in default and the creditor would 
then initiate proceedings to recover what remains of the secured assets.  
   
In this paper, it is assumed that a credit default theory is mainly intended for use to 
estimate expected losses through an understanding of the causes of credit default.  In 
practice a loss from a given default often involves lengthy delays (of months or even years) 
either in a sale of the collateralised asset or in a sale of that asset to a debt collector for 
loan value recovery or in making a claim from an insurer.  The practical definition of a 
default as a delinquency with a time lag is therefore merely to provide an early recognition 
of potential loss and the time lag may vary from country to country due to cultural and 
legal differences.   
 
There is no compelling research to suggest a particular delinquency period: 30-days, 90-
days or 180-days which will optimise the trade-off between timeliness in the warning of a 
loss and the likelihood of an actual loss from default.   Therefore there is a need to make a 
distinction between the current practical definitions of default and a theoretical 
definition, which is necessary to create a credit default theory.  A successful credit default 
theory should be able to estimate the optimal delinquency time lag which is likely to 
indicate significant expected loss in any given jurisdiction.  Therefore a specific time lag 
should not be used in a theoretical definition of credit default. 
 
With this preamble, simple working theoretical definitions of credit defaults are given as 
follows. 
 
For an unsecured loan, a credit default is defined as a delinquency.  For a secured loan, a 
credit default is defined as the occurrence of both delinquency and insolvency.  
 
For an unsecured loan such as a credit card loan, counting a delinquency as a credit 
default seems a little harsh at first sight.  But many such loans have very low payment 
obligations so that delinquency rates and therefore default rates are substantially less than 
what one would expect.  Indeed lenders of unsecured loans seek to obtain substantial gains 
from charging high interest rates on outstanding balances after the minimum payment 
obligations have been made.   The loss given default when the borrower is unable to even 
make the minimum payment obligation will depend on the debt collection process and 
other cultural and legal factors.  It is outside the scope of this paper to provide a theory of 
expected loss for unsecured loan defaults.  
 
Our definition of credit default for a secured loan is consistent with Moody’s definition
18 
mentioned above, as it includes the notion of an expected loss.  In this definition, neither 
                                                                                                                                           
16Moody’s defines a bond default as any missed or delayed disbursement of interest and/or 
principal, bankruptcy, receivership, or distressed exchange where (i) the issuer offered 
bondholders a new security or package of securities that amount to a diminished financial 
obligation (such as preferred or common stock, or debt with a lower coupon or par amount) or (ii) 
the exchange had the apparent purpose of helping the borrower avoid default. 
17A good credit default theory provides more than expected loss estimates, as it should provide 
insights into what determines the soundness of financial positions of entities.  
18See Keenan (1999). Page 6 of 27 
delinquency nor insolvency alone is sufficient to cause a credit default.  Both delinquency 
and insolvency are necessary and sufficient for credit default.   
 
In reality a credit default event for a secured loan is a sequence of two temporally 
separated events: a delinquency event followed by an insolvency event.  If a borrower 
always make full loan payments by due dates, insolvency is irrelevant.  Insolvency alone 
cannot cause a credit default, because the assets of an entity is not easily observable at 
any given time, even to insiders, particularly if the assets include intangibles such as 
franchise value, trademarks and intellectual property.  Only a delinquency is assumed to 
cause a net equity position to be evaluated, leading to a possible conclusion of insolvency 
and therefore credit default. 
 
If a corporation or an individual has strong and steady cash flows, such as companies in 
some service industries or utilities, then very high debt levels relative to assets can be 
carried without the risk of the entity’s solvency condition being evaluated.  Another 
example
19 is the Hong Kong property market 1998-2003 where home owners had sufficient 
liquidity to forestall default even though many had negative equity.  In such cases, 
structural models which use insolvency as condition of default would overestimate the risk 
of default. 
 
On the other hand, during the dot.com era, many hi-tech companies were continually 
delinquent on their debt payments due negative operating cash flows (“burning cash”) but 
were able to survive through capital raisings as shareholders and lenders continually raised 
the valuations of their corporate assets.  Inability to meet a debt payment obligation by 
the due date in such cases does not necessarily lead to credit default.   
 
Another typical example is sovereign debt, which may be delinquent but often does not 
lead to credit default by our definition.  On 2 July 1998 the Republic of Venezuela missed a 
debt payment
20 on treasury bonds but made up for it on 9 July 1998.  This was not a credit 
default event by our definition but was briefly a delinquency event. 
 
The causal framework therefore consists of two parts: delinquency and insolvency.  Loan 
delinquency is a condition of liquidity failure or having insufficient cash flow to service the 
loan.  Delinquency triggers a solvency assessment which may lead to a conclusion of 
negative equity position causing loan termination and an expectation of loss by the lender.  
This framework is expected to have wide applications where the main tasks are to build 
specific causal models for delinquency and models for insolvency within the general 
framework. 
 
The causal framework also includes a formal theory of how a model of delinquency and a 
model of insolvency can be joined together to create a theory of credit default.  An 
investigation into causes of credit default is a joint investigation into causes of delinquency 
or liquidity failure and causes of insolvency or negative equity.  The formal theory is best 




3. Model of Delinquency 
 
Delinquency occurs when a borrower is unable to make a loan payment by the due date, 
caused by liquidity failure.  Negative cash flow is considered one of the main causes of 
liquidity failure.  For a corporation, debt payments are usually made from operating cash 
flows.  Liquidity failure tends to occur when there is insufficient income from operating a 
                                             
19 This example is discussed in detail below in Section 6. 
20 See Keenan (1999). Page 7 of 27 
business which is running at a loss.  As a simplification
21 liquidity failure is modelled by a 
situation of negative cash flow.  
 
In the analogous situation of a household with a home loan liquidity failure occurs when 
total disposable income after allowing for cost of living and other expenses is insufficient 
to meet debt payments.  For an investor of a rental property with an investment loan cash 
flow before debt payment is determined by rental income plus the tax benefit from 
possible negative gearing.  For simplicity of illustration, we restrict ourselves to owner-
occupier loans or home loans for brevity.  
 
 
3.1 Loan Serviceability Ratio 
 
For application to residential mortgages, we introduce a loan serviceability rate  S r , which 
is defined as the maximum loan interest rate a owner-occupier borrower can service a loan 








                                                    (1) 
 
where W represents gross income from wages, salaries and other sources,  (.) τ is a 
nonlinear function to calculate after-tax income from pre-tax income, D is other debt 
repayment and  X is the cost of living which may be represented by some minimum or 
acceptable standard of living cost for the given number of persons.  The numerator can be 
considered the net disposable income available to service a housing loan. 
 
Fiscal policy would affect the nonlinear tax function  (.) τ  directly, employment conditions, 
divorce rates etc would affect the gross income W and inflation would affect the cost of 
living and also wages and salaries.  For brevity, we will refer to an owner occupier loan 
simply as a home loan in this paper. 
 
A typical home loan in Australia has a variable or adjustable interest rate and a 25-year 
term at origination.  The mortgage payment rate for home loan is therefore
22 
 




r r δ                                                  (2) 
 
where δ is the loan amortization rate and  25 = n  is the typical term to maturity at 
origination.  In this case, the loan size is reduced by the factor  ) 1 ( δ − each year.   
 
Given a loan serviceability rate we can define a Loan Serviceability Ratio (LSR) which is the 
loan serviceability rate divided by the loan payment rate.  For home loans, LSR is denoted 













                                            (3) 
 
Note that other serviceability ratios such as Debt Service Ratio (DSR) or Debt Cover Ratio 
(DCR) typically does not include the cost of living as we have done.  The advantage of LSR 
as a serviceability risk measure is that because LSR is normalised to loan size, 
                                             
21 Liquidity failure could also be caused by business interruptions due to natural catastrophes like 
earthquakes or floods.  
22 This is equivalent to the more familiar expression: { }
n r r
− + − ) 1 ( 1 /  Page 8 of 27 
serviceability of loans of different sizes can be compared. 
 
3.2 LSR Evolution 
 
The risk in loan serviceability comes from the fact that serviceability changes over time 
due changes in individual circumstances and changes in the economic environment.  A loan 
which may have started off as being easily serviceable loan may become a struggle for the 
borrower due to unanticipated adverse developments. 
  
The LSR variable given an initial value S x  can evolve a priori in any stochastic manner since 
the underlying individual variables on which the LSR variable depends can evolve according 
a number of stochastic processes.  The finance literature provides studies on many possibly 
relevant stochastic processes, including some which are described by probability density 
functions with fat tails.  It is premature for this paper to examine the best candidate for 
the stochastic process which determines the evolution of the LSR variable.  As we have no 
strong reason at this stage to reject a simple Gaussian stochastic process, we will make 
this assumption in this paper for simplicity, leaving other stochastic processes for possible 
future investigation. 
    
With the Gaussian assumption, LSR evolves according to the well-known parabolic heat 
diffusion equation used by Black and Scholes (1973) and Samuelson (1973) for option 
pricing.  As we are not concerned with traded markets, the appropriate discounting rates 
or drift rate
23 to avoid arbitrage opportunity rising in option pricing of securities is 
unimportant here. The free boundary solution is given by a lognormal distribution for LSR 
with a drift rate  S µ  and volatility S σ .   Another way of expressing this result is that after a 













=                                               (4) 
 
That is  S z is a standard Normal variate with zero mean and unit standard deviation.  The 
probability of liquidity failure  S P  when LSR < 1 is given by 
 
) ( S S z N P − =                                                        (5) 
 
where (.) N  is the standard Normal (cumulative) probability function.   S P  is the probability 
that the borrower will face a cash flow problem in meeting a loan payment at time t .  This 
provides a simple model for loan delinquency
24 and may be used to explain some empirical 
“default” data which are actually delinquency data. 
 
A borrower may purchase insurance to avoid potential situations of liquidity failure.  A 
manufacturing company may buy business interruption insurance and a wage earner may 
buy income protection insurance.  In such cases, the borrower will face a cash flow 
problem only when the insurance company rejects the claim and the probability of 
liquidity failure including counter-party risk is then given by  CD SP P where  CD P denotes the 
probability of claim denial.  Under usual circumstances the probability of claim denial is 
assumed to be very small.  Unless there is specific information on insurance, we will 
generally make the simple assumption that the borrowers are uninsured against liquidity 
failure. 
                                             
23 See Samuelson (1973). 
24 Commins, Esho, Pattenden, Sy, and Thavabalan (2007) have used this model to forecast 
delinquency rates for a portfolio of newly approved residential mortgages.  Page 9 of 27 
 
Note that delinquency is modelled by a single composite variable LSR which is a nonlinear 
function of micro and macroeconomic causal variables.  In general the causal variables 
interact nonlinearly to determine LSR and cannot be made linear without making further 
compromising assumptions.  The LSR variable is random and uncertain over time because 
the causal variables are uncertain over time due to changing borrower circumstances and 
unexpected developments in the macroeconomic environment.  Risk factors such as 
interest rates cause changes in the probability of delinquency through the LSR variable in 
combination with all other risk factors. 
 
In concluding this section, we emphasis this is merely one of many potential models for 
delinquency or liquidity of the borrower.  We have chosen the above simple one because 
empirical data needed for the model have been collected by lending institutions and are 
available to be used to estimate loan serviceability.  The LSR variable which is the key 
stochastic variable to model liquidity in our framework can depend on an arbitrary number 
of risk factors each of which may have its own peculiar statistical properties.  Our main 
contribution to credit default theory is to suggest how the relevant risk factors should be 
combined in a single causal variable in a parsimonious model.  The alternative is to have a 
large number of ad-hoc independent risk variables each with its own stochastic dynamic in 
an unstructured model devoid of any causality or insight.        
 
 
4. Model of Insolvency 
 
In the original Merton model
25 for insolvency the random variable which determines credit 
default risk is the assets to liabilities ratio, which defines a situation of negative equity if 
it is less than one.  The Gaussian model for this random variable has been generalised
26 to 
include non-Gaussian models in the KMV modifications.  
 
Here we follow the simple approach but will not repeating the derivations and arguments 
of the original Merton paper, except for summarizing the main results in our notation.  In 
our application to residential mortgages the corresponding random variable is the property 
Value-to-Loan ratio or the reciprocal of the Loan-to-Value ratio (LVR) which we designate 
as  V x and defined simply by 
 
L V xV / =                                                             (6) 
 
If we model the evolution of  V x  as a Gaussian stochastic process, as did Merton, then the 
evolution of the LVR variable after time t can be described by a random variable 













=                                               (7) 
 
where the random inverse LVR variable has a drift rate  V µ  and volatility V σ .   The variable 
V z sometime called the “distance to default” in the Merton model. It is a standard Normal 
variate with zero mean and unit standard deviation.  In our model we may call this 
“distance to negative equity”.  
 
The probability of negative equity  V P  when LVR > 1 is given by 
                                             
25 See Merton (1974). 
26 See Bohn (2006). Page 10 of 27 
 
) ( V V z N P − =                                                     (8) 
 
where (.) N  is the standard Normal (cumulative) probability function.  The random value-


















                                (9) 
 
where  ln( ) yx =  and the distribution depends on the drift, volatility parameters and time.  
The initial value-to-loan ratio  V x evolves to 
y
V x e at time t where  y is random variable 
described by the above probability density function. 
 
The borrower can be viewed as a holder of a perpetual American put option, which can be 
exercised at any time t provided the option has a positive value.  The put option is “in-
the-money” if the property value is less than the loan value: a condition of negative 
equity.  The expected value of the put option is given by the expected value of the “pay-




V Max x e −                                                  (10) 
 
Integration of the pay-off function over the probability density function gives the expected 
pay-off for the borrower in exercising the option.  Since the expected gain to the borrower 
equals the expected loss to the lender EL V , the value of the expected loss per unit loan 
value is given by 
 
( ) exp( ) ( ) EL V V V V VN zx t N z µ ′ =−− −                                  (11) 
 
where we have introduced a second argument for the cumulative Normal probability 
function  (.) N  with  VVV zz t σ ′ =+ . 
 
We have an expression for the expected loss and an expression for the probability of 
negative equity.  If negative equity happens to cause a default then the expected value of 
loss-given-default  LGD V is given by 
 
1 exp( ) ( )/ ( ) LGD V V V V Vxt N z N z µ ′ =− − −                                 (12) 
 
We consider this to be an adequate model for estimating expected loss-given-default (LGD) 
for residential mortgages in this paper.  Note that we do not discuss discounting to obtain 
the present value, as we are not concerned with trading LGD in market equilibrium, but we 
are only concerned with its expected value at time t.  
 
The above expression assumes the lender has no mortgage insurance.  If the lender does 
have mortgage insurance then the expected loss-given-default must be adjusted for likely 
insurance recoveries from claims.  The amount of realised protection falling short of the 
full insured value is itself a random variable, which may be modelled in a similar way to 
the above random variables. 
 
Introducing an analogous random variable  I z  for insurance shortfall, at a later time, the 
insured loss-given-default is modified to 
 Page 11 of 27 
( ){1 exp( ) ( )/ ( )} LGD I V V V V VN zx t N z N z µ ′ =− − − −                            (13) 
  
where the modifying term on the right hands side denotes the probability of shortfall  I z  
which is a random variable modelling the position of the insurer.  In most situations the 
probability of insurance shortfall would be zero or very small, according to recent 
experiences in a benign financial environment.  However under highly stressed market 
conditions where insurers are making substantial losses the insurance shortfalls from claim 
denials or loss adjustments may increase significantly.  In most cases, one would use 
models where insurance shortfall becomes significant only under large and sustained falls 
in property prices.  Equation (13) provides an approach to incorporate counter-party 
insurer risk for the lender. 
 
We have considered expected loss in relation to insolvency of an entity.  The model can 
also be modified to consider expected loss by a debt holder of various levels of seniority in 
relation to corporate debt securities.  The recovery rates
27 from loss due defaults are areas 
of current research. 
 
In concluding this section, we note that our contribution restores the simplicity of Merton’s 
original idea of insolvency as a cause of default.  In doing this we are suggesting
28 that 
subsequent developments of structural approach mostly attempt to extend the basic 
solvency model by introducing risk factors which do not sit comfortably in that context.  
Instead, we suggest risk factors such as interest rate for example belong more 
appropriately in the model for liquidity.  
 
 
5. Model of credit default 
 
Given our hypothesis that credit defaults are determined jointly by two random variables 
S z  for liquidity failure and  V z for negative equity, we can model credit default itself as a 
random variable  D z  which is some function  f of the independent variables: 
 
) , , ( t z z f z V S D = .                                                     (14) 
 
5.1 Model of Default Probability 
 
Let D denote the set of default events at time t.  The default events are determined 
solely by liquidity failure events and negative equity events, denoted here by the sets S 
and V respectively where 
 
{} |: Sg zz z t t =< − − S                                                 (15) 
  {} |: V zz z t =< − V                                                      (16) 
 
Note that S and V  may be temporally separated
29 by a time gap  g t and the probability 
( ) P D for D is given by Bayes’ rules for conditioning 
 
() () (| ) PP P =∩∩ D D SV SV                                             (17) 
 
                                             
27 For example, see Dullmann and Trapp (2004). 
28 For a more detail discussion see Section 7 below. 
29 In most applications we can ignore this time gap as a first approximation, even though a finite 
value is more realistic. Page 12 of 27 
Our assumption that  ∩ SV is necessary and sufficient for D means  
 
() |1 P ∩= DS V .                                                   (18) 
Hence the probability of default  ( ) P D is simply given by the joint probability () P ∩ SV .  In 
general the random variables  S z  for liquidity failure and  V z for negative equity may be 
correlated.  Under our Gaussian assumptions, the probability of default at time t is 













                                               (19) 
 













.                                                (20) 
 
 




D P P p z z t dzdz
−−
−∞ −∞
′′ ≡= ∫ ∫ D                                   (21) 
 
In the special case where the twin causes of default are independent and uncorrelated 
then  0 ρ = then 
() ( ) ()() PP P P =∩ = DS VS V                                        (22) 
or, 
() () D SV S V PP PN z N z == −− .                                        (23) 
 
This result provides immediately an important insight.  Since by necessity  1 S P ≤  the 
probability of default in our theory is always less than or equal to that from Merton-type 
models, all else being equal.  This may explain why the expected default frequency (EDF) 
predicted from the KMV approach
30 tends to over-estimate the actual default rates.  In 
case of the Hong Kong property crash 1998-2003 described by Fan and Peng (2005), we 
expect  1 S P   as the mortgage holders’ ability to service their debt remained largely 
unimpaired
31 even though many loans have had negative equity.     
 
 
5.2 Model of Loss Given Default 
 
Regardless of how the default probabilities of delinquency and insolvency are correlated, 
the LGD is given by the expected equity shortfall: 
 
( ){1 exp( ) ( )/ ( )} LGD I V V V V VN zx t N z N z µ ′ =− − − − ,                        (24) 
 
for the general case with mortgage insurance.  The corresponding expected loss for the 
case of uncorrelated causes is given by the analytic expression: 
                                             
30 See Kealhofer (2003). 
31 The improved mortgage serviceability is explained in detail in Section 6.  Page 13 of 27 
 
() ( ){ ( ) exp( ) ( )} EL S I V V V V VN z N z N zx t N z µ ′ =− − −− − .                    (25) 
 
Note that evaluation of the random variables may be temporally separated but in the 
following order:  S z ,  V z  and  v z′ , then  I z . 
 
Unlike the reduced form approach
32 which requires a separate and possibly inconsistent 
procedure to calculate expected losses through recovery rate estimation, in our approach 
all relevant quantities are determined endogenously and consistently.  Vexing questions 
such as how PD and LGD are correlated, what are acceptable levels for LGD or whether 
microeconomic or macroeconomic factors are more important simply do not arise in our 
approach. 
 
Note that the current approach links the four drivers of credit risk identified by the Basel II 
Accord: exposure at default, probability of default, loss given default and maturity into a 
single unified model, where questions about how the drivers are correlated through the 
economic cycle being implicitly addressed through the model parameters. 
 
 
5.3 Term structure of PD and LGD 
 
Given initial values of LSR and LVR, our model can be used to assess how the loan 
characteristics will change in time under various scenario assumptions.  For a home loan 
with a LSR given by  1.4 S x =  and a range of LVR levels we consider two illustrative 
example scenarios of steadily rising and steadily falling property prices. 
 
In the examples chosen, we have assumed independent causation because over a period of 
a few years there is no compelling reason to assume risk factors such as interest rates and 
property prices must necessarily be positive or negatively correlated.  However, we leave 
open the possibility of future refinements in the treatment of correlation through the use 
of equation (21).   
 
We summarise in Table 1 two sets of the model parameters which will be discussed more 
thoroughly in the next section.  In a property boom prices rise rapidly and employment and 
interest rate environments are at least mildly positive, as is generally the case in the past 
few years.  Judging by relevant historical experiences
33, a property bust may have 
moderate and steady property price declines for a few years, with a net-neutral 
employment and interest rate environment, but marked increases in volatilities of the risk 
factors. 
 
Table 1: Model Parameters Representing  
Boom and Bust Conditions 
Parameter  Boom (%)  Bust (%) 
V µ   20 -10 
V σ   20 25 
S µ   5 0 
S σ   15 25 
 
Figure 1 shows the term structure of the probability of default (PD) for boom conditions 
                                             
32 See Section 7 for a discussion. 
33 See Helbling (2005) and Schnure (2005). Page 14 of 27 
defined in Table 1 with initial LSR value of 1.4.   Figure 2 shows the corresponding term 
structure for bust conditions defined in Table 1. 
 
Figure 1: Boom Condition Probability of Default 
Each curve represents a different initial LVR as Labelled  
Boom Condition Probability of Default (%)
Loan age (years)







































Figure 2: Bust Condition Probability of Default 
Each curve represents a different initial LVR as Labelled 
Bust Condition Probability of Default (%)
Loan age (years)















































The first stylised observation is that the term structure of default probabilities or its shape 
depends on market conditions.  In rising property markets, the probability of default for 
owner occupier or home loans peaks in the two or three years.  This is what has been 
observed empirically in the property boom of the last several years.  This term structure is 
inappropriate for falling property markets.  
 
The second qualitative remark is that loan age is not an exogenous variable, as is 
sometimes assumed to be.  If one estimates statistical regression models using recent data 
of rising property markets, then one would get highest probability of default correlations 
with loan ages of two or three years.  The peaking of default probability in the first two or 
three years of a loan is not an intrinsic property of home loans but is reflective of the Page 15 of 27 
particular economic environment of the empirical data.  Such regression coefficients are 
therefore biased by the historical data and would be inappropriate in a falling property 
market, where probability of default will continue to rise with loan age. 
 
Thirdly, comparing Figure 1 and Figure 2, it is seen that the probability of default can 
increase dramatically when a strongly rising property market changes to a falling property 
market.  Statistical regression models will most likely suffer from myopic historical 
sampling bias after a long period of boom conditions.  From our model, a probability of 
default for high LVR loans can change from at a small fraction of 1% in a strongly rising 
market to more than 20% after a few years of a falling market.  The turnaround can be 
highly nonlinear and dramatic. 
 
The term structures of loss-given-defaults (LGD) for boom and bust conditions defined in 
Table 1 corresponding Figure 1 and Figure 2, with initial LSR value of 1.4 are shown in 
Figure 3 and Figure 4. 
 
Figure 3: Boom Condition Loss Given Default 
Each curve represents a different initial LVR as Labelled 
Boom Condition Loss Given Default (%)
Loan age (years)











































Figure 4: Bust Condition Loss Given Default 
Each curve represents a different initial LVR as Labelled 
Bust Condition Loss Given Default (%)
Loan age (years)
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The fourth observation is LGD is not constant and it rises with time, mainly because 
uncertainty increases with time.  If the loans are uninsured, the LGD can quickly rise above 
10% in a couple of years for high LVR loans even in a strongly rising market.  In a falling 
property market the corresponding values can be a few times higher and the LGD increases 
significantly over time.  These characteristics differ substantially from the constant LGD 
assumptions used in some of the current credit default models, which may be reflective of 
the statistics of recent boom conditions where LGD tends to plateau after several years, as 
Figure 3 suggests. 
     
How PD and LGD are correlated depends on market conditions and the loan portfolio.  For 
example, in strongly rising property market, a loan portfolio with high average loan age, 
then PD and LGD would be negatively correlated, whereas in a falling market, PD and LGD 
would be positively correlated.  Also, in a rising market, because of the shape of the term 
structure of PD, the part of the portfolio with low loan age would have PD and LGD 
positively correlated, whereas the part of the portfolio with high loan age would have PD 
and LGD negatively correlated.  Our theory suggests that current debates about whether 
PD and LGD should be positively or negatively correlated at different parts of the economic 
cycle suggest incompleteness of existing theories. 
 
Direct causes of credit default are defined as those independent primary variables which 
define and model liquidity and equity variables as in equation (3) and (6).  Primary 
variables may be modelled by dependencies on secondary variables, which are then 
considered indirect causes.  For example, liquidity is directly dependent in equation (3) on 
wages or gross income, which in turn may be modelled by a dependence on industrial 
production, which is then a secondary variable representing an indirect cause.  
 
Any plausible risk factor such as inflation which may be statistically correlated to the 
frequency of credit default cannot be considered a direct cause of credit default unless we 
can show that the real mortgage interest rate is fixed and constant over time, making 
mortgage interest rates in equation (3) vary directly with inflation.  As this is not the case, 
inflation is not a direct cause of credit default in our theory.  Rather, it is an indirect 
cause. 
 
6. Macroeconomic Causation 
 
In principle there should be a credit default model for each loan, because a house located 
in one part of the city may behave predictably differently in term of its likely price 
movement from that of another house located in another part of the same city.  There is 
also information on individual circumstances of the borrower which would be relevant in 
estimating default probability, if known.  In practice we cannot expect such fine 
granularity of the empirical data.  Our ignorance of such details is modelled through the 
uncertainty implied by the cross-sectional volatility of the risk variables.   
 
However, there may be some scope for modelling housing loans in each state or region 
differently if we believe that there are common factors driving default risk based on 
geography.  For example some suburbs are known to have high unemployment or some 
regions may be experiencing housing shortages due localised economic booms.  Such 
knowledge may be used to advantage in accessing credit default risk. 
 
There are certainly macroeconomic factors which will have an impact potentially on all 
housing loans.  Macroeconomic stresses are positively correlated on all housing loans, only 
the degree of correlation between individual loans may be uncertain in some cases.   But 
this uncertainty is of no concern to us, because it is implicitly accounted for in our 
intended loan-by-loan calculations. Page 17 of 27 
 
Because we have developed a causal theory, we have direct mathematical links between 
known risk factors such as a rise or fall in interest rates to our model parameters.  It is 
through these linkages that we can carry out macroeconomic stress testing on the housing 
loan portfolios.  How do changes in fiscal and monetary policy, unemployment and housing 
property prices affect the borrower’s liquidity and equity risks?  
 
 
6.1 Macroeconomic impact on home loans 
 
We are principally interested in stress testing over a time horizon of a few years.  For 
simplicity of illustration we will ignore the impact of fiscal policy changes which operate 
via a nonlinear tax function  (.) τ .  We introduce a compressed expression for LSR and write 
 
() ( ) ln ln / S x Um L =                                                 (26) 
 
The symbol U denoted “uncommitted” net disposable income after tax and living expenses 
available to service a mortgage and m is the loan payment rate.  Differentiating this 
equation with respect to time we obtain 
 




SUm σσσ =+.                                                    (28) 
 
As the most variable part of U is the gross wages and salaries (W ),  U µ  and  U σ  can be 
considered the rate of change and the log volatility of average wages and salaries in the 
economy.  Also, since the most variable part of m is the general interest rate, rather than 
mortgage spread,  m µ and  m σ  can be approximated the rate of change and the log volatility 
of the interest rate in the economy. 
 
In a similar consideration for equation (6), for home loans, the rate of change of the equity 
random variable  V µ is the rate of change of property prices  P µ plus the loan amortization 
rate δ , since the Value-to-Loan ratio increases with loan amortization.    
 
 
6.2 Hong Kong Like Conditions 
 
In a service oriented economy like Hong Kong
34, property is widely used as collateral for 
consumer and business loans.  This adds significantly to the property market exposure of 
the banking sector which has already more than 50% of its loans directed to residential 
mortgages, property construction, development and investment. 
 
In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, over a period of six years from 1998 
to 2003 average property prices dropped 60-70%, with office properties being the hardest 
hit.  As much as 30% of residential mortgage loans had negative equity.  While property 
prices were dropping continuously throughout the period, the loan delinquency ratio rose 
at first from slightly above 2% to a peak of more than 7% in 1999.  But thereafter it 
dropped continuously to less than 3% by the end of 2003. 
 
                                             
34 See Fan and Peng (2005). Page 18 of 27 
This would represent an unsolved puzzle
35 for a credit default theory based largely on 
negative equity alone.  But we also know that interest rates largely fell on average over 
the period.  After an initial reflexive hike in interest rates probably to defend the currency 
the Hong Kong Monetary Authority lowered the discount window base rate from 8% to 2.5% 
by the end of 2003.  Base money rose from $196.5 billion to $292.6 billion through the 
period, representing significant injection of liquidity into the financial system.  Even 
though the bank sector’s asset quality and profitability fell considerably, the sector as a 
whole remained relatively healthy with a strong capital position. 
 
Without data on loan details it is not possible to fully account for the development of this 
event with any quantitative accuracy.  It is worthwhile to take this example to illustrate 
how our theory can be used to provide the broad outline of an explanation and how it can 
be applied for stress testing. 
 
The macroeconomic data suggest that  0.15 V µ =− , representing a fall in average property 
prices of 15% p.a. for six years and that  0.20 S µ = , representing a 20% p.a. improvement 
in loan serviceability due to a 20% p.a. fall in the change of interest rates.  Using volatility 
parameters  0.20 V σ =  and  0.25 S σ =  and taking as a typical case an initial Loan 
Serviceability Ratio:  1.2 S x = , we have a set of probability of default curves for LVR 
ranging from 0.7 to 1.10 in steps of 0.1 over the six-year period.  Evidently the curves in 
Figure 5 have the same qualitative behaviour as that actually observed
36 in Hong Kong 
between 1998 and 2003. 
 
 
Figure 5: Probability of Default under 
Hong Kong Like Conditions 1998-2003 
Each curve represents a different initial LVR from 0.7 to 1.1 
In steps of 0.1 from low to high 
All Loans Probability of Default (%)
Hong Kong (1998-2003) Like Conditions 
Loan age (years)













































                                             
35 Yam (2003) said “Quite apart from its effects on individuals and families, negative equity has 
broader economic implications. It has an enervating effect on spending. And it adds to the 
pressures on the banking system, although it should be added that the delinquency ratio on 
mortgages continues to be very low. This is, I think, attributable partly to the fortitude with 
which homeowners in negative equity have borne the problem, and partly to the willingness of 
most banks to restructure loans in cases of difficulty.”  He did not attribute any part to monetary 
stimulus which is the main explanation preferred in this paper. 
36 See Fan and Peng (2005). Page 19 of 27 
 
The peak of Hong Kong interest rates roughly coincided with the bursting of the US stock 
market bubble in 2000.  Had this not happened, the strong monetary stimulus in Hong Kong 
might not have occurred and the subsequent development for residential mortgage loans 
could be significantly different from what did happened, as shown in Figure 6, where all 
parameters remained the same except for the remove of the fall in interest rates.  Instead 
of delinquency rates peaking at 7%, they might have continued to rise to more than 50% 
over six years, assuming the monetary authorities remained inert over the period (which is 
probably unlikely).  
  
Figure 6: Probability of Default under 
Hong Kong Conditions without Monetary Stimulus 
Each curve represents a different initial LVR from 0.7 to 1.1 
In steps of 0.1 from low to high 
All Loans Probability of Default (%)
Hong Kong (1998-2003) Without Monetary Stimulus
Loan age (years)









































7. Discussion on Related Work 
 
If we date the beginning of modern credit default theory from the Merton model
37 in 1974, 
then there has been more than 30 years of significant research contributions on credit 
default to review.  In the limited space below our remarks will not be balanced or 
complete and will not do full justice to past contributions.  We will merely highlight major 
differences in our approach to the existing approaches to put the contributions of this 
paper in perspective.  The main existing approaches are the structural approach and the 
reduced form approach which form the basis of a number of commercial risk management 
products
38.   
 
7.1 Structural Approach 
 
The structural approach to credit default refers to the Merton model
39 and its extensions 
and modifications.  Kealhofer (2003) rightly claimed that the structural approach can be 
                                             
37 See Merton (1974). 
38 See e.g. Crouhy, Galai and Mark (2000). CreditPortfolioView is based on a multi-period reduced 
form approach with macroeconomic risk factors (Wilson, 1997).  CreditMetrics, CreditVaR, 
CreditRisk+ and KMV can be classified under the structural approach (CreditMetrics, 1997; 
Kealhofer, 2003). The Kamakura Corporation uses both approaches. 
39 See Merton (1974). Page 20 of 27 
causal, unlike the reduced form approach which can only be non-causal and will be 
discussed below.  Our indebtedness to the structural approach is evidenced by our 
acceptance of Merton model as a model of insolvency in Section 4 above.   
 
Subsequent extensions and modifications have left the basic idea of insolvency in the 
Merton model unchanged.   Extensions to the original Merton model by Vasicek and 
Kealhofer incorporated into the KMV model
40 include expanded definitions of assets and 
liabilities, payments of coupons and dividends, empirically determined default barriers and 
non-Gaussian probability density functions.  The KMV model is the main Merton-type model 
in use today to estimate “default” probabilities.  There are many other variations
41 (to the 
original Merton model), such as changing default thresholds but they all have essentially 
the same basic Merton model structure. 
 
Some authors have considered risk factors which are considered important in this paper 
such as failure of cash flow to cover interest payment
42 and interest rate impact on coupon 
payments
43.  However these factors are considered in those studies as exogenous stochastic 
processes which modify the structure of the basic model and in doing so lose the important 
property of causality, making them more and more non-causal and similar to the reduced 
form approach discussed below. 
 
Most of these subsequent models relinquish another important advantage of the basic 
Merton model which is the simultaneous determination of the probability of default and 
expected loss endogenously.  In their attempts to improve the estimation of the probability 
of default, they have made expected loss an exogenous variable and thus created another 
theoretical problem for estimating expected loss. 
 
In this paper, the Merton model is restored as a model of expected loss from insolvency.  
Since insolvency is a necessary but not a sufficient condition by our definition of credit 
default, the Merton model is not a model of credit default.  A necessary concept for credit 
default is liquidity failure leading to delinquency described above.  The various risk factors 
which later modifications sought to introduce to the Merton model should be introduced 
through the delinquency model of the causal framework.  Our approach to new risk factors 
is to provide endogenous explanations through the causal framework rather than to 
introduce new independent variables needing additional exogenous stochastic processes. 
  
While including a large number of risk factors in the analysis presents a challenge
44 for the 
structural approach, it is easily accommodated in the reduced form approach. 
 
 
2.2 Reduced Form Approach 
 
The reduced form approach has been gaining in popularity over the structural approach 
recently
45 because they can take into account more of the observable risk factors which 
appear empirically to be relevant in determining credit default risk.   They appear
46 to fit 
default data better than structural models, particularly when applied to credit default 
spreads (CDS) where there are abundant empirical data.  This superior assessment has  
                                             
40 See Bohn (2006). 
41 See Leland & Toft (1996), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) and Kim, Ramaswamy and Sundaresan 
(1993), which pre-date the KMV model. 
42 See Nielsen, Saa-Requejo and Santa-Clara (1993). 
43 See Kim, Ramaswamy and Sundaresan (1993).  
44 See Tarashev (2005). 
45 See Jarrow and Protter (2004). 
46 See Bharath and Shumway (2005).  If a model’s sole purpose is to fit empirical data then it should 
fit data better than other models which may have other objectives apart from fitting observed 
data. Page 21 of 27 
 
been disputed in true out-of-sample tests by others
47. 
 
The reduced form approach does not actually produce credit default theories.  Jarrow and 
Protter (2004) state that the reduced form approach is a subjective approach preferred by 
modellers with incomplete information for the purpose of pricing and hedging in markets.  




48 are empirical models of default probability which use whatever 
data that are available and considered relevant to the modeller.  Important risk variables 
which are known to be significant determinants of credit default may be excluded from the 
model if the data are inadequate or unavailable
49.  The models are based on logistic 
regression
50 where statistical estimation of the linear regression coefficients is critical to 
the performance of the models.  Despite their popularity, reduced form models have 
serious drawbacks. 
 
Firstly, reduced form models are non-causal.  Correlation of a perceived risk driver to 
frequency of default may be coincidental or only indirectly related.  In the sciences
51, 
discovery of correlation is merely a first step to investigate causation which leads to 
theoretical causal models.  
 
Secondly, reduced form models are hostage to the empirical data needed for model 
estimation.  The data determine the regression coefficients and hence the model itself.  
There is a different model for every set of data.  The estimates of expected loss can differ 
arbitrarily even for exactly the same loan portfolio if different empirical data and risk 
factors are used.  Also, it is doubtful whether models constructed with bull market data 
will be valid for bear markets. 
 
Thirdly, in the reduced form approach PD and LGD are estimated separately. 
There are many different suggestions
52 for how to estimate LGD.  Divergent approaches for 
LGD lead to much debate
53 over such simple issues as the level and direction of correlation 
between PD and LGD.  These issues suggest the possibility of logical contradictions in the 
methods used. 
 
Finally, reduced form models assume linear or log-linear relations between dependent and 
independent variables.  They are limited only to small changes to default probabilities in a 
given equilibrium state of the world and they are invalid for large changes which are 
required for stress testing purposes
54.  They are also inadequate for changing market 






                                             
47 See Arora, Bohn and Zhu (2005). 
48 See Jarrow and Turnbull (1996). 
49 See Jarrow and Protter (2004) for the reasons to exclude the asset values of an entity. 
50 See Cox (1972). 
51 See Cox (1972) and applications to hazard models in clinical medicine. 
52 For example, Duffie and Singleton (1999) suggest an econometric approach, while Unal et al. 
(2001) suggest an approach based on the seniority of the debt holder over the claims on 
defaulting firm’s tangible assets.  Dullmann and Trapp (2004) believe systematic risk is a major 
factor influencing recovery rates.  Hackbarth, Miao and Morellec (2006) consider capital structure 
and macroeconomic conditions. 
53 See Altman, Brooks, Resti and Sironi (2005). 




Consider a logit default variable  y driven for simplicity by only one independent 
variable x .  A Taylor series expansion about a given state  0 x can be written as 
 





( ) ( )() () . . .
2
dy d y
yx yx x x x x
dx dx
=+− + − +                            (29) 
 
In a linear regression typical of reduced form models, one estimates  0 () yx and 
/ dy dx(evaluated at 0 x ) of the first two terms on the right hand side from empirical data 
to determine the regression coefficients for the intercept and slope of a straight line.  The 
other terms are ignored or assumed to be negligible, which is valid only if the deviations 
0 () x x −  are small.  For stress testing large deviations are assumed and therefore higher 
order nonlinear terms may be important.   
 
To make these remarks more precise in a highly simplified illustration, consider a 
hypothetical world where the default probability is accurately given by a simple Merton 
model which has only the one known exogenous variable.  Without knowing this “hidden” 
true causal relationship imagine how one might estimate a reduced form model from the 










                                             (30) 
 
Here  p is the probability of default, Y is the endogenous variable and  X is the exogenous 
variable.  Given a set of n  empirical data points{, } ii X Y , ( 1,..., ) in = , one estimates the 
regression coefficients a  and b . 
 
Suppose the data set comes from a scenario represented by the dotted lines in Figure 7, 
then we would expect the data points to cluster around the dotted lines.  Because extreme 
values are less frequent than less extreme values, the distribution of points would 
concentrate mostly around the exogenous variable being slightly less than one in the chart, 
representing small failures.  The nonlinear relationship between the endogenous and 
exogenous variables implies that the regression coefficient of the slope b weighted by high 
density points would under-estimate the probability of default of high impact events, 
further to the left of 1 in the chart.  Hence the reduced form approach can under estimate 
the risk of high impact events. 
 
A second scenario represented by the solid lines obviously has very different functional 
relationship between the probability of default and the exogenous variable.  If we had data 
only for the first scenario, then there is no method which could be used to infer the 
behaviour of the second scenario from knowledge of the first scenario.  Hence the reduced 
form approach can lead to significant model errors due to the lack of empirical data to 











Figure 7: Logit Merton Model  
Each curve represents a different scenario 
Logit Merton Model
Exogeneous Variable




































The knowledgeable and observant reader may immediately suspect that it is the rate of 
change of the exogenous variable that is linearly related to the default variable.  Figure 8 
shows that even if we exponentially transform the exogenous variable, which changes the 
variable to a rate of change variable, nonlinearity still remains.  This shows the potential 
limitations of the linearization assumption which is inherent in the reduced form approach.   
 
Figure 8: Logit/Log Merton Model  
Each curve represents a different scenario 
Logit/Log Merton Model
Log(Exogeneous Variable)
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The linearization assumption is consistent with a general equilibrium assumption of the 
market or the economy, where observed changes are merely small deviations from an 
essentially static world.  There may be an abstract sense in which this idea of equilibrium 
may be valid but there are no theoretical estimates of time scales or sizes of fluctuations, 
under which assumed deviations may be considered small. 
 
In this paper we have taken a scientific rather than a market based approach.  Given a set 
of conditions or causes our objective is to predict their effects on future observed rates of 
credit default.  There is a substantial research literature
55 on the relationship between the 
probability of default and corporate bond prices or credit spreads.  There are many reasons 
not to follow such market based approaches.  The main one is that credit default occurs in 
many situations where there are no traded markets.  Credit defaults should be understood 
in its own right, independent of trading behaviour.  Therefore we have a much more 
modest ambition of predicting the rates of credit defaults a few years ahead from given 
initial conditions. 
 
The most common approach to credit default currently is to treat delinquency as default 
and estimate the probability of default using a reduced form approach.  Then the expected 
loss is estimated by separate recovery models
56, which are independent of the model for 
default and therefore may lead to inconsistent assumptions being made in separate 
models.  In this paper the definition of credit default which includes the potential for loss 
in the probability of default binds the models together and forces consistent modelling. 
 
In the mortgage and credit market crisis of 2007, substantially changed market conditions 
rendered most existing empirical models of credit default inappropriate as they were 
estimated under different market conditions.  As a result, traders were unable or unwilling 
to price credit risk and the market became illiquid.  Our approach to credit default and 
credit risk pricing does not depend on large amount of empirical data or the existence of 
traded market.  Therefore it can be used potentially to calculate credit risk prices in the 
volatile environment of 2007 and thus could potentially help maintain market liquidity.  
 
 
8. Conclusion and Further Research 
 
A causal framework has been proposed where credit default theories can be systematically 
developed to investigate the reasons for credit default.  Our hypothesis is that a credit 
default is caused by both delinquency and insolvency.  Any risk factor can only be 
considered relevant if it has a demonstrable causal impact on delinquency or insolvency.  
This imposes a structural discipline which is lacking in many other theories.  For example, 
even if sunspot frequency or crime rate were to show significant correlation to credit 
default rates, it can only be used as a risk variable in our approach if it can be causally 
linked to the model in either liquidity or the equity position of a financial entity.  
 
Implicit in this framework is a research program to investigate credit default generally and 
systematically.  New theories of credit default are then created from new models for 
delinquency and/or insolvency.  In this paper, we have only illustrated one of the many 
possible theories.  Already the power of the approach has resolved a number of puzzles 
observed in empirical data in relation to existing credit default theory.  Moreover, by 
changing model parameters, our approach can be used to price credit risk dynamically in 
changing market environments, whereas most existing approaches being empirical cannot. 
 
The development of the causal mortgage default theory in this paper also shows other 
advantages in our joint probability approach.  The delinquency and insolvency models can 
                                             
55 See Duffie & Singleton (1999), Elton, Gruber, Agrawal & Mann (2001) and Arora, Bohn & Zhu 
(2005). 
56 See Altman, Brooks, Resti & Sironi (2005) and Dullmann & Trapp (2004). Page 25 of 27 
easily be extended to include such effects as insurance on liquidity from income protection 
insurance and on solvency from lender mortgage insurance.  There are other possible 
enhancements such as non-Brownian stochastic processes and time dependent dynamic 
model parameters for varying macroeconomic conditions.  The present account of the 
theory has been kept deliberately as simple as possible to highlight the essential ideas.  
 
As the new mortgage default theory developed here is fully causal and nonlinear, it 
provides a valid method for stress testing
57 home loan portfolios due to large changes in 
risk factors.  As the theory is intended to apply to individual loans, portfolio correlation is 
implicit as common risk drivers simultaneously affecting each loan but in different ways.  
Practical application of the theory requires disaggregated data on individual loans at a 
particular point in time which may not be generally available due to deficiencies of past 
data collection and may need to be estimated.   Reports from such studies are in 
preparation and will be presented elsewhere. 
 
Clearly a causal theory of corporate default has significant implications for the pricing of 
equity and debt securities of companies and for prudential regulation of financial 
institutions.  The model for liquidity or delinquency can be determined by the data 
contained in profit and loss statements, while the model for equity or solvency can be 
determined by the data contained in balance sheet statements.  Such data are publicly 
available if only infrequently such as annually.  The causal framework described in this 
paper holds substantial promise for the development of causal theories of corporate 
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